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Abstract
Previous research has shown that individuals are most likely to escalate
the amount of resources committed to a course of action when they have been
personally responsible for negative consequences (Staw, OBHP , in press) . The
present study examined the process of escalation over three points in time and
under four experimental conditions. A 2x2x3 factorial experiment was conducted
in which personal responsibility, efficacy of resources, and time were the
independent variables, and commitment of resources to a course of action was
the dependent variable. The results replicated the escalation effect over an
immediate time period, but showed that investment of resources in a course
of action was not stable over time. Although there were immediate effects
of personal responsibility and efficacy of resources upon escalation behavior,
these two variables interacted with the time factor.

Escalation: The Determinants of Commitment
to a Previously Chosen Course of Action
Few important organizational decisions are free from subsequent reevaluation
or consideration. Instead, a large number of critical decisions resemble an
investment context in which resources are allocated to one alternative over
others and in which the level of resources may subsequently be increased or
decreased. For example, in both the public and private sector, policy-makers
may ponder two or more alternatives for which to invest a quantity of resources
,
and, depending upon the results of this initial investment decision, the level
of resources committed to the course of action may then be dramatically increased
or decreased. The research reported here is aimed at studying the determinants
of escalation in investment decision contexts, Of particular interest is the
effect of adverse consequences upon the decision to escalate or withdraw resources
from a previously chosen course of action.
To date, there has been little empirical research specifically designed
to examine the investment decision context, and, as a result, it is difficult
to determine whether adverse consequences will lead to the withdrawal of resources
or escalation. Intuitively, one might expect individuals simply to reverse
decisions or change behaviors which result in negative consequences. Yet, some
indirectly related studies have found that when a person's behavior leads to
negative consequences, he may, instead of changing his behavior, cognitively
distort the negative consequences to more positively valenced outcomes (e.g. Freedma
1963; Pallak, Sogin, & Van Zante, 1974; Staw, 1974, 1975; Weick, 1964). The
mechanism underlying this biasing of behavioral outcomes is often characterized
as a self-justification process in which individuals seek to rationalize their
previous behavior or psychologically defend themselves against a perceived error
in judgement (Aronson, 1968, 1972; Festinger, 1957).

In many situations it is also possible for individuals to go beyond the
passive distortion of adverse consequences in an effort to rationalize a behavioral
error. For example, when negative consequences are incurred within an investment
context, it is often possible for a decis ion-maker to greatly enlarge the
commitment of resources and undergo the risk of additional negative outcomes in
order to justify prior behavior or demonstrate the ultimate rationality of an
original course of action. Rather than accept an immediate loss and withdraw
from a poor investment alternative, many decision-makers may be prone to conmit
new and additional resources. However, since higher levels of commitment may
also lead to greater and greater material losses, self-justification can lead
one into a costly circle of escalation. Within the sphere of governmental policy-
making, just such an example of escalating commitment was described by George Ball,
the former Undersecretary of State, in some early predictions of U.S. involvement
in Indochina.
...Once large numbers of U.S. troops are committed to direct
combat, they will begin to take heavy casualties in a war
they are ill-equipped to fight in a non-cooperative if not
downright hostile countryside. Once we suffer large casualties,
we will have started a well-nigh irreversible process. Our
involvement will be so great that we cannot—without national
humiliation—stop short of achieving our complete objectives.
Of the two possibilities, I think humiliation would be more
likely than the achievement of our objectives—even after
we have paid terrible costs . (Memo from George Ball to
President Lyndon Johnson, July, 1965; source: The Pentagon
Papers, 1971.)
Obviously, many factors influenced governmental decision-making in the commitment
of men and material to the war in Indochina. Nonetheless, the comments of this
high level official do underscore the need for research on the determinants of
escalation in resource investment decisions. Although group, organizational,
and large-scale political factors can affect the commitment of resources in
a given situation, there may also be a significant individual tendency to
escalate following the receipt of negative consequences. If so, this information

is of relevance to effective policy formulation, be it in government, business,
or voluntary organizations.
Previous Research
There has been only one empirical study which has dealt specifically with
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the process of escalation in investment decision contexts, Recently, Staw
(in press) conducted an experiment in which undergraduate business students
were asked to play the role of a financial executive in deciding upon the proper
allocation of research and development funds. Subjects were asked to act as
the Financial Vice President of a large technologically-oriented firm in working
on a business decision case. After studying the financial history of this
hypothetical company, subjects were asked to recommend the allocation of research
and development funds to either the consumer or industrial products division of
the firm, and to write a paragraph justifying the basis for this dichotomous
decision. Subsequently, these same subjects were given financial information
showing either an improvement or continued decline in the sales and earnings
of each corporate division. Finally, after receiving this information, subjects
were asked to make a second investment dec'sion dividing additional R&D funds
in any way they wished between the two corporate divisions.
Decision consequences were manipulated in the Staw (in press) experiment
through the random assignment of financial information. Some subjects were
provided information that the division initially chosen for extra R&D funds
performed better than the unchosen division, while others were given information
that the chosen division subsequently performed worse than the unchosen division.
In addition to the manipulation of decision consequences, the experiment also
varied the level of personal responsibility for consequences. One half of the
subjects were randomly assigned to the high personal responsibility condition
in which two investment decisions were sequentially made by the subject.

This condition entailed the two-part financial decision case described above in
which subjects made an initial decision to allocate R&D funds, discovered its
consequences/ and then made a second investment decision. However, one half of
the subjects were also randomly assigned to a low personal responsibility
condition in which the entire financial decision case was presented in one
section. In the low personal responsibility condition, subjects were asked to
make the second allocation decision without having made a prior choice as to
which corporate division was most deserving of R&D funds. Subjects in this
condition were told in the case that an earlier R&D funding decision had been
made by another financial officer of the company and that the preceding officer
had decided to invest all of the R&D funds in the consumer (or industrial)
products division. The financial information presented to low personal responsibil-
ity subjects was identical to that given to other subjects except for the fact
that the case's scenario began at a later point in time and necessitated making
the second investment decision without having participated in an earlier choice.
Staw had predicted, in accordance with self-justification theory, that
individuals would invest the greatest amount of resources when they were personally
responsible for negative consequences. And, as expected, there were significant
main effects of decision consequences and personal responsibility such that the
greatest commitment of resources occurred under negative rather than positive
consequences and under high rather than low personal responsibility. Also, as
predicted, there was a significant interaction such that commitment was even
greater when individuals were personally responsible for negative consequences
than could be expected by the additive effects of these two separate factors.
In short, the data of this previous experiment provided strong evidence that
escalation of commitment can result from adverse consequences in an investment
decision context.

The present study is designed to expand upon the earlier Staw (in press)
experiment in several important respects. First, it would appear necessary to
know whether the escalation of commitment 13 a transitory phenomenon or if it is
capable of persisting over many points in time. When negative consequences
result from an initial investment decision and then additional resources are
committed to the same course of action, will further negative consequences cause
a sudden reversal in policy or an additional escalation of commitment? In a
similar vein, it is desirable to know if commitment to a losing alternative
can be built-up over time even though a dec is ion-maker may not have been personally
responsible for the original course of action which led to adverse consequences.
Finally, it is important to know if the efficacy of resources committed to a
course of action will effect the process of escalation or withdrawal. Does it
make a difference if it is highly probable that the commitment of new resources
will turn an unfavorable situation around (i.e. high efficacy) or if it is highly
uncertain that new resources will improve investment returns (i.e. low efficacy)?
The answers to these questions are of substantial social relevance as well as
theoretical interest in understanding the determinants of escalation in investment
decision contexts.
The present study consists of a 2x2x3 factorial design. The independent
variables are personal responsibility , efficacy of resources , and time . Commitment
to a course of action comprises the dependent variable. This design allows for
a replication of the effect of personal responsibility previously found by Staw
(in press) , and provides a test for the effect of efficacy upon the commitment
of resources. In addition, the design permits examination of the escalation
process over three successive decision points. It is thus possible to examine
the main effect of time as well as the interaction of time with other factors upon
the commitment of resources to a previously chosen course of action.

Method
Subjects
The subjects of this experiment were 96 undergraduate students enrolled
in the College of Commerce and Business Administration at the University of
Illinois/ Urbana-Champaign . There were an equal number of males and females
selected for the study as a whole and an equal number assigned to each experimental
condition.
As in the previous Staw (in press) experiment, subjects were asked to work
on a "Financial Decision Case" in which it was necessary to play the role of
a corporate executive in making some decisions about the allocation of research
and development funds. Subjects were told that the purpose of the study was
to investigate the effects of various amounts of information upon financial
decision-making, and that they would be asked to make at least three financial
decisions. In addition, subjects were told that, although the particular case
on which they would be working contained only a limited amount of information,
the information provided should still be sufficient to make a "good financial
decision". Since subjects in the experiment were students in a business school,
they were generally experienced in working on written cases in which a behavioral
or financial scenario is presented and some action or set of actions is called
for by the participant.
The Financial Decision Case
The financial decision case used in this study describes a hypothetical
corporation (The Adams & Smith Company) in the year 1971. The case presents a
scenario in which the subject is asked to play a major role in financial decision-
making, and data on corporate sales and earnings are presented for the years
1960 to 1970 (see data in Table 1). As stated in the case, the profitability of
the Adams & Smith Company, a large technologically-oriented firm, has been

declining over recent years, and the directors of the company have agreed that
one of the major reasons for the decline in corporate earnings (and a deterioration
in competitive position) lay in some aspect of the firm's program of research
and development. The case further states that the company's directors have
concluded that 10 million dollars of additional R&D funds should be made available
to its major operating divisions, but, for the time being, the extra funding
should be invested in only one of the corporation's two largest divisions. At
this point, the case diverges for subjects assigned to the experimental conditions
of high and low personal responsibility.
Insert Table 1 about here
Responsibility Conditions
In the high responsibility condition, subjects were asked to act in the
role of Financial Vice President in determining which of the two corporate
divisions, Consumer Products or Industrial Products, should receive additional
R&D funding for the years 1971-73. A brief description of each corporate division
was included in the case material, and subjects were asked to make the dichotomous
investment decision on the basis of the potential benefit that R&D funding would
have upon future earnings of the company. After selecting one of the two corporate
divisions and writing a brief paragraph defending the choice, subjects turned
this first section of the case in to the experimenter. Subsequently, subjects
in the high responsibility condition were administered a second section of the
case which provided information on the financial condition of the company as of
1974 , three years following the initial allocation of R&D funds. The second
section of the case stated that the R&D program of Adams & Smith was again up
for reevaluation and funding for the years 1974-1976. In response to requests from
both divisions for more money, it was stated that the directors of the company

8had created a new general fund of $20 million for R&D as well as other uses.
Thus, the subject/ as the Financial Vice President, was asked to allocate an
amount from zero to 20 million dollars to tae previously chosen division,
and from zero to 20 million dollars to be reserved for other uses.
One half of the subjects were also randomly assigned to a low responsibility
condition. As in the Staw (in press) experiment, low responsibility subjects
were asked to make the second investment decision without having made a prior
dichotomous choice as to which corporate division was most deserving of R&D
funds. Subjects in this condition received one set of case materials which
described the financial condition of the Adams & Smith Company as of 1974 , the
time of the second R&D funding decision. They were told in the case that the
initial R&D funding decision had been made in 1971 by another financial officer
of the company, and that the preceding officer had decided to invest all of the
R&D funds in the Consumer (or Industrial) Products division. The financial
results of each corporate decision (e.g. sales and earnings data) were presented
from 1960 to 1973, and, like other subjects, persons in the low responsibility
condition were asked to make the second R&D funding decision based upon the
potential for future earnings. In sum, the information presented to low personal
responsibility subjects was identical to that given to other subjects except
for the fact that the case's scenario began at a later point in time (1974 rather
than 1971) and necessitated making the second investment decision without having
participated in an earlier choice. Thus, low responsibility subjects also
allocated from zero to 20 million dollars to the division previously chosen
(by another financial officer) , and from zero to 20 million dollars was reserved
for other uses.

The Temporal Ordering of Investment Decisions
As described above, all subjects received the same financial data on the
Adams & Smith Company for the years 1960-19 '3. In addition, all subjects made
an R&D investment decision for the 1974-76 time period. Subsequently, each
subject was given the financial results of his or her investment decision in
terms of (simulated) 1974-76 corporate sales and earnings and was asked to
make a new investment decision for the 1977-1979 time period. Finally, subjects
were informed of sales and earnings for the 1977-1979 period, and were asked
to allocate research and development funds for the 1980-1982 time frame. The
temporal ordering of these investment decisions is outlined in Figure 1.
Insert Figure 1 about here'
In examining Figure 1 it is important to note that, for each investment
decision made by subjects, they were asked to allocate from zero to 20 million
dollars to the division which was originally chosen as being most deserving of
R&D funding. Thus, subjects in the high responsibility condition were asked to
make an initial dichotomous decision as to the relative merits of the Consumer
versus Industrial Products division, and then to make three subsequent decisions
allocating from zero to 20 million dollars in additional funding to that division.
In contrast, subjects in the low responsibility condition made three decisions
to allocate additional money to the division initially chosen by another financial
officer of the firm. The commitment decision at each point in time consisted
of subjects completing the following form:
Sample. Coae RexLomnzndation Vonm
A& the. Tina.ncA.aJL Vice. VK.eAi.de.nt in the. 6itimtion
deAcAibe.d by the. caae, you. asie. to deXeAmine. how muck ofi
the. addctionaZ $20 mUXJLon should be. alZocated to tixe.
pieviou&ly frmde.d divi&ion and hou) much &houid be allocated
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to otkeA a6t6 ion. AiAcal yeasu> {1974 through 1976). The.
de.QAAi.on Id to be. made on the. ba&it> oh the. pote.ntial be.ne.hit
oh the added neAejxxck handing, to the. Rotate ean.ni.nQh. oh the.
division.
dolla/ii allocated to [Con6umeA] PfioducXh
_doU.au Ke^ejwtd jon. otheA u6eA
= Total
VLeaAe. uinite. a bnie,h pa/iagiaph de.he.nding you/i de,ci&ion'>
Ik page, ho*- paKaghjaph]
Decision Consequences
All subjects, whether they were assigned to the high or low responsibility
conditions, received similar sales and earnings data (see Table 1). The results
given to subjects for each of the investment decisions displayed no significant
upturn in sales (as might be expected to result from increased R&D expenditures)
but instead showed a continuation of divisional losses. These data were presented
to subjects as being derived from a sophisticated economic simulation conducted
by experts in the financial field. To assure credibility, the experimenter,
upon receipt of each of the subject's investment decisions, looked up the
corresponding earnings and sales figures from a complex and detailed chart which
was described to subjects at the start of the experiment as containing the
simulated results of various R&D allocation decisions.
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Efficacy of Resources Manipulation
In addition to two levels of personal responsibility, subjects were also
randomly assigned to conditions of high and low resource efficacy. This
manipulation occurred in the first part of the experiment and consisted of
providing additional data and description of the Consumer and Industrial Products
divisions of the firm. The manipulation informed subjects that there was either
a high or low likelihood that additional R&D funding would help the financial
condition of the Adams S Smith Company. Efficacy of resources was experimentally
manipulated by informing subjects (in the case) that an outside consultant had
performed an extensive review of the corporate divisions, and that his report
reflected either uncertainty or praise of the divisional management. In the
low efficacy condition, the subject was informed that both divisions possessed
"inconsistent planning and project selection groups," and that it was "uncertain
whether the management teams for both the Consumer and Industrial Products
divisions could effectively administer additional research and development funds."
In the high efficacy condition, subjects were informed that both divisions had
a "high quality planning and project selection group," and that "it was highly
likely that the management teams for both Consumer and Industrial Products
could effectively administer additional R&D funds." Before making their first
investment decisions, subjects were also provided with a table showing the
percentage of projects judged to be successful for the two divisions over a
fifteen year period (see Table 2) . In the high efficacy condition, these data
showed that the R&D project success rate recently reached a new high of 77%,
while in the low efficacy condition the data reached a new low of 28%.
Insert Table 2 about here
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Overall Design
As described, the overall design of the experiment consisted of a 2x2x3
factorial with personal responsibility, eff cacy, and time as the independent
variables. As displayed in Figure 1, all subjects participated in at least
three investment decisions. The dependent variable of interest was the amount
of money allocated to the initially chosen alternative at Time 1 (1974 decision)
,
Time 2 (1977 decision) , and Time 3 (1980 decision) . Regardless of the experimental
condition to which subjects were assigned, each was informed that the financial
condition of Adams & Smith continued to worsen. Thus, unlike the previous
Staw (in press) experiment, all subjects were run under negative decision
consequences
.
Results
Preliminary Analysis
A preliminary analysis was conducted to test whether the object of a
subject's prior choice, be it Consumer or Industrial Products, affected subsequent
investment decisions. For subjects in the high responsibility condition, there
was no difference in subsequent investment oehavior between persons who
initially selected Consumer or Industrial Products as the best alternative.
Therefore, these subgroups were combined in further analyses. For subjects in
the low responsibility condition (who were told that another financial officer
had previously chosen Consumer or Industrial Products as the best alternative)
differences were also checked. For low responsibility subjects, the initially
chosen alternative was randomly assigned rather than self-selected. As expected,
there were no differences in subsequent investment behavior between subjects told that
another financial officer had selected Consumer Products or Industrial Products,
and, thus, these subgroups were also combined in further data analyses.
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Immediate Effects
In order to examine the immediate effects of Responsibility and Efficacy
,
a 2x2 analysis of variance was conducted us-.ig Time 1, or 1974 decision data
{see Table 3) . The purpose of this analysis was to measure the immediate
effects of the experimental treatments and to provide a test for the replication
of previous data. In the Staw (in press) study, there was a significant main
effect of personal responsibility upon the commitment of resources to a
previously chosen course of action. After experiencing negative feedback on
an initial investment choice, subjects in the Staw (in press) study allocated an
average of $12.97 million under the condition of high responsibility and $9.43
million under low responsibility. In the present experiment, there was also
a significant main effect of personal responsibility (F=9.40, d.f.=l/92, p<.003)
.
Subjects allocated an average of $11.99 million to the previously chosen alternative
under high responsibility and $8.58 million under low responsibility. Thus,
the two studies were quite consistent in their findings.
Using the Time 1 (1974 decision) data, there was also an immediate effect
of efficacy of resources upon investment in the previously chosen alternative.
Under high efficacy, subjects invested an average of $11.53 million, while only
$9.04 million was invested under the low efficacy condition. The main effect
of efficacy upon Time 1 investment behavior was statistically significant
(F=5.02, d.f.=l/92, p<.03).
Insert Table 3 about here
Effects Over Time
Table 4 presents the amount of money subjects allocated over three time
periods to the initially chosen alternative. A 2x2x3 analysis of variance
summary for Responsibility, Efficacy, and Time is presented in Table 5.
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The summary shows a main effect of Time and also significant interactions of
Responsibility by Time and Efficacy by Time. For the main effect of Time,
Newman-Keuls mean comparisons (Winer, 1971) revealed a significant overall
decrement (p<.01) in dollars invested from Time 1 (mean=10.29) to Time 2
(mean=7.17) However, at Time 3 the amount invested (mean=8.97) was greater than
at Time 2 and the increase between Time 2 and Time 3 was statistically significant
(p<.05)
.
Insert Table 4 and Table 6 about here
Figure 2 presents the effect of Responsibility as a function of Time.
Simple main effects of Time were computed for both low and high responsibility
subjects. Although there were no differences across the three points in time
for low responsibility subjects, the effect of Time for high responsibility
subjects was significant (F=11.74, d.f. =2/184, p<.001). For high responsibility
subjects, Newman-Keuls mean comparisons showed a significant (p<.01) decrement
in dollars invested between Time 1 and Time 2 and a significant increase (p<.05)
in dollars invested from Time 2 to Time 3. However, it should be noted that,
even with the increase, the amount of money invested at Time 3 was still significantly
less than the money invested at Time 1 (p<.01).
Insert Figure 2 about here
Figure 3 presents the effect of Efficacy as a function of Time. For subjects
in the low efficacy condition, simple main effects of Time indicated that there
were no differences among investment decisions for Time 1, Time 2, and Time 3.
In contrast, the simple main effect of Time for high efficacy subjects was
significant (F=9.46, d.f. =2/184, p<.01). Newman-Keuls mean comparisons indicated
that subjects invested more money at Time 1 than at Time 2 or at Time 3 (p<.01)
.
The increase from Time 2 to Time 3 was not statistically significant.
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Insert Figure 3 about here
The similarity of the Responsibility by Time interaction in Figure 2
and the Efficacy by Time interaction in Figure 3 is noteworthy. Low responsibility
and low efficacy subjects both tended to make stable or slightly increased
investments over time. In contrast, high responsibility and high efficacy
subjects both tended to invest more at Time 1 than at Times 2 and 3. Moreover,
subjects in the high responsibility and efficacy conditions both tended to
increase the level of their investment from Time 2 to Time 3, although this
increase was not always statistically significant.
Analysis of Sex Effects
In addition to the primary analyses, a 2x2x2x3 analysis of variance of
Responsibility, Efficacy, Sex, and Time was performed to determine whether
a person's sex influenced the amount of money invested in the initially chosen
alternative. The analysis revealed the same results as the primary analyses
except that the Sex factor also interacted with Responsibility and Time
(F=3.27, d.f .=2/176, p<.05) . Inspection of the means indicated that the
investments of males and females were very similar under high responsibility
conditions. Males and females also made similar investments under low responsi-
bility conditions with the exception that females tended to invest more at
Time 2 than males.
Discussion
The primary purpose of this experiment was to examine the persistence of
the escalation process over time. Staw (in press) had shown that an individual
may became especially committed to a course of action when he has been responsible
for negative consequences. However, the design of that experiment involved
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only two investment decisions—one to commit the subject on a course of action
and a second with which to measure an increase in commitment following negative
consequences. Thus, the Staw (in press) da a do not cast light on the temporal
nature of the escalation process.
In the present study, data for high responsibility subjects showed that
commitment to a course of action was greatest immediately following the receipt
of negative consequences. As shown in Figure 2, the Time 1 decision data
closely replicated the main effect of responsibility found by Staw. However,
it can also be seen from Figure 2 that the commitment of resources dropped
markedly from the first to the second investment decision, and then rebounded
only slightly on the third decision trial. Thus, investment decisions for high
responsibility subjects were highly unstable, while resources committed by
low responsibility subjects changed little over time.
The data of the present experiment also showed an immediate effect of
efficacy of resources upon investment decisions. When subjects were given
information that the success rate of R&D projects was high they invested more
money than when they were told that the success rate was low. However, like
the. responsibility effect, the investment decisions of persons in the high
efficacy condition were unstable. As shown in Figure 3, the pattern of the
data for high and low efficacy conditions closely resembled that of high and
low responsibility conditions.
In interpreting the results, it is interesting to observe the pattern of
means displayed in Table 4. In three of the four experimental conditions the
greatest amount of money was invested on the first decision, the least amount
on the second, while an intermediate amount was invested on the third decision
trial. What seemed to have occurred, and this effect was most pronounced in
the high responsibility-high efficacy condition, was the following: after
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receiving negative feedback on the initial investment of R&D in Consumer or
Industrial Products, subjects greatly escalated the commitment of resources
to the previously chosen course of action. However, upon receiving additional
negative consequences, subjects tended to withhold new investment or keep it
at a lower level. Finally, after receiving further negative results, investment
was again increased. It is possible that subjects perceived that the decreased
investment of R&D from their Time 2 decisions had contributed to the continuing
decline in financial results, and that this downtrend could still be arrested
by increased investment at Time 3. In any event, escalation did not diminish
over time as one might expect when individuals are given negative feedback or
"punishment" over repeated trials.
Implications
Research on the escalation process is at a preliminary stage. The results
of the present study confirm the earlier data (Staw, in press) that escalation
is likely to occur when individuals are responsible for negative consequences.
However, the present findings show that the effects over time can be quite
complex. Repeated negative consequences can lead to a sequence of escalation,
discouragement and withdrawal, and then reescalation
.
It is tempting to draw analogies from the present line of research to
cases of escalation in everyday life. For example, U.S. participation in the
Indochina War followed a period of escalation, withdrawal, and an attempt to
reescalate (recently blocked by Congress) . However, it is far too early to
posit that any experimentally-based data can so neatly parallel real world
conditions. At best, efforts can be made to capture some of the more important
elements of the escalation process. Responsibility or original participation
in the formulation of a course of action clearly seems to be an important
variable and one which should continue to be central in future research.

18
The efficacy of resources, or how likely additional investment will yield
positive returns, also seems to be a relevant factor. Escalation may result
from an unrealistically high estimation of -t-he capabilities of one's material
resources as well as personal involvement in determining a prior course of
action
Future Research
Future research on escalation should be extended upon three lines. First,
new experiments should be conducted which examine the effects of additional
independent variables upon the escalation of commitment. Specific factors
worthy of study may be the amount of loss incurred by a decision-maker (see Weick,
1974, for discussion of the "Vietnam Dollar" phenomenon) , the nature of the
decision-making entity (e.g. individual decision-maker versus a decision-making
group)
,
perceptual attribution of characteristics following decision consequences
(see Staw, 1975), personality characteristics of the decision-maker (e.g. self-
esteem, tolerance for ambiguity) , and the evaluative consequences of the situation
(see Rosenberg, 1969, for a relevant discussion of evaluation apprehension).
Secondly, research should attempt to examine escalation processes within
several decision contexts. Both the Staw (in press) study and the present
experiment utilized a simulated R&D decision context. Additional research
should focus upon escalation in (simulated or real) public service programs,
military situations, and even the stock market. Each of these situations
contains the same basic features of the investment decision context— initial
choice of a course of action and opportunity for subsequent escalation or
withdrawal.
Finally, considerable research effort should be placed into developing a
normative model of escalation. During the 1960 's it was commonly believed in the
U.S. that programs of sufficient size and scope could solve most important problems,
be they social or military. However, in recent years, many policy-makers have become
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skeptical of escalation as a tactic for reversing an adverse situation. The
comments of Edmund (Jerry) Brown, the current Governor of California, may be
representative of this change in sentiment.
The fact that there's a problem doesn't mean that more
government will make it better. It might make it worse.
The interventionism that we 've seen in our society is
analogous to Vietnam. . . .When problems don't go away^
we escalate the attack until somebody gives up. I'm
rethinking some of that escalatory social interventionism.
Inaction may be the highest form of action. {From an
interview with correspondent Jess Cook, Time, 1975.)
Future research should specifically examine the relationship of escalation to
measures of effectiveness. It has been posited by Simon (1974, personal
communication) that individuals who are prone to escalate following negative
consequences may actually make poor business and public executives. This
proposition is certainly testable, given a reliable measure of escalatory
tendencies.
In conclusion, it seems that the relationship between escalation and
effectiveness would depend primarily upon the forces operating in a given
situation or the relevant "state of nature". Sometimes, increased allocation
of resources and resolute faith in a course of action may be rewarded by success,
and at other times it may lead to even greater losses. What should be related
to effective decision-making, then, is the ability to assess a current situation
or to perceive future trends—not a consistent tendency to escalate or withdraw
resources in investment decision contexts. Any consistent individual tendency
to escalate or withdraw following the receipt of negative consequences would
most likely be quite disfunctional over the long-run. Thus, individual mechanisms
which serve as linear determinants of escalation (e.g. self-justification) or
group tendencies to choose escalatory tactics (e.g. via a risky-shift effect)
could in general be negatively related to effective decision-making. These
hypotheses are obviously speculative and call for considerable empirical research.
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Footnotes
1. The authors wish to thank Paul S. Goodman and Herbert A. Simon for an
initial discussion of ideas which led to this paper; Greg R. Oldham,
Louis R. Pondy, and Gerald R. Salancik for their comments on an earlier
draft of this manuscript; and The Center for Advanced Study at the University
of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign for the facilities necessary to complete
the research.
2. The only other existing research on escalation deals with the escalation
of conflict within interpersonal and intergroup contexts. In these
studies, escalation refers to a heightening of tension or harm-doing
rather than an investment of resources to a particular course of action.
3. In both this study and the Staw (in press) experiment, subjects were told
(in the case) that the previous financial vice-president had suddenly
died of a heart attack. This explanation was provided so that the departure
from office of the previous vice-president would not be associated with
the failure of past policy decisions.
4. The data combination of relatively constant sales with decreasing earnings
was chosen for the years 1971-1979 so as to provide a situation with high
external validity (Campbell, 1957) . Within an inflationary economy
(e.g. 1970*s), relatively constant or slightly increasing sales actually
represent a real decline in revenue, and are commonly associated with
decreasing earnings or increased losses.
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Table I
Divisional Contributions to Sales and Earnings
of Adams & Smith Company
Consumer Products Industrial Products
23
a
Fiscal Year bSales bEarni gs Sales bEarnings
1960 624 14.42 670 15.31
1961 626 10.27 663 10.92
1962 649 8.65 689 11.06
1963 681 8.46 711 10.44
1964 674 4.19 724 9.04
1965 702 5.35 735 6.38
1966 717
•
3.92 748 5.42
1967 741 4.66 756 3.09
1968 765 2.48 784 3.26
1969 770 C12) C 788 (.81)°
1970 768 (.64)° 791 (.83> C
January, 1971: Dichotomous Investment Decision—allocation of R&D to Consumer
versus Industrial Products
1971-1973d 770 . (.74) 794 (.95)
January, 1974: Allocation of to 20 million dollars additional R&D to Initially
Chosen Alternative
1974-1976d 773 (.85) 796 (1.09)
January, 1977: Allocation of to 20 Million dollars additional R&D to Initially
Chosen Alternative
1977-1979d 775 (.98) 799 (1.25)
January, 1980: Allocation of to 20 million dollars additional R&D to Initially
Chosen Alternative
a
.fiscal year ending December 31
D
.
in millions of dollars
c
.parentheses denote net losses in earnmgs
average sales and earnings for three-year period
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Table 2
Percentage of Projects udged Successful
in High and Low Efficacy Conditions
Experimental
Condition
Fiscal
Year
Percent Successful Projects
High
Efficacy
1955-1959
1960-1964
1965-1969
73%
74%
77%
Low
Efficacy
1955-1959
1960-1964
1965-1969
44%
37%
28%
—
r-
- ,

Table 3
Analysis of Varianc Summary for
Time 1 (1974) Decision Data
25
Source df MS
Responsibility
Efficacy
Responsibility X Efficacy
Error
1 278.46 9.40**
1 148.75 5.02*
1 11.00 .37
92 29.63
**p<
.003
*p<.03
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Table 5
Analysis of Variane Summary for
Responsibility and Efficacy over Time
27
Source df MS
Between Subjects 95
Responsibility
Efficacy
Responsibility X Efficacy
Error (Subj . w. groups)
1 1.53 .03
1 28.13 .62
1 4.50 .10
92 45.04
Within Subjects 192
Time
Responsibility X Time
Efficacy X Time
Responsibility X Efficacy X Time
Error (Time X Subj. w. groups)
2 235.55 6.31**
2 230.39 6.17**
2 180.00 4.82*
2 15,51 .42
184 37.32
**p< .003
*p<.01
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Figure Captions
Figure 1: Temporal ordering of investment decisions and feedback on results
for subjects in high and low responsibility conditions.
Figure 2: Interaction of Responsibility and Time.
Figure 3: Interaction of Efficacy and Time.
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